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to the Parliamentary Budget Committee
Budgetary discussions this year are taking place at a time when the Spanish economy is deep 
in a process of adjustment proving much more pronounced than initially expected. The inter-
national backdrop is marked by the weakening of the US economy, sharp rises in oil and com-
modities prices and, above all, the scale and persistence of the turmoil on international fi nan-
cial markets. Given the latest events in the United States and Europe, it is no exaggeration to 
say that we are faced with a global fi nancial crisis without precedent in recent times which will 
require an overhaul of the principles that have governed the regulation of international fi nances 
in recent decades.
The world economy is in exceptional circumstances, with a general loss of economic dyna-
mism, surging infl ationary pressures and serious fi nancial instability problems. These are exac-
erbating and accentuating the adjustment of the Spanish economy which the exhaustion of 
the cycle had already set in train, following a long period of expansion. Moreover, this is the fi rst 
occasion on which the Spanish economy has faced such a process since joining the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, which provides undoubted buttresses but also poses considera-
ble challenges. The economic policy debate behind the preparation and approval of the Budg-
et is thus of crucial importance.
The far-reaching changes in the Spanish economy in recent decades have equipped it with the 
wherewithal to overcome this diffi cult stage and to subsequently resume a path of sustained 
growth, allowing convergence to continue. But if these factors are to operate, the authorities 
and all agents must face up to the current circumstances and make the required efforts, and 
economic policies must prevent any slippage and enable the factors conducive to the resump-
tion of sustained growth to come into play.
Naturally, I shall focus today on the diagnosis of the situation of the Spanish economy and on 
its economic policy implications. But these would both be incomplete without some, albeit 
brief, reference to the deterioration of the international setting and to the economic outlook in 
the euro area which, as you know, will determine monetary policy developments.
Last year, the growth of the world economy reached 5%. The forecasts available for this year, 
however, place the fi gure below 4%, with scarcely any scope for the start of a recovery in 
2009. Moreover, any recovery will be moderate, slow and subject to a degree of uncertainty 
fuelled, among other developments, by a rise in major infl ationary pressures in most econo-
mies. In my view, there are three basic factors behind this deterioration of the global eco-
nomic situation.
The fi rst is the adverse behaviour of the US economy, weighted down by the continuing de-
cline in its real estate sector, which is depressing household and investor confi dence. Until 
relatively recently, the emerging economies have been considerably more dynamic, partly off-
setting the greater slackness in the more industrialised countries such as the United States. 
However, doubts over the real ability of these economies to continue posting robust growth 
rates amid the virtual stagnation of the more advanced countries are ever greater.
The increase in oil and commodities prices is the second of the basic factors behind recent 
developments in activity and infl ation at the global level, despite the relative easing since the 
summer. The effects of these price rises have been fully felt in the more advanced economies, 
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while in the emerging economies the pass-through of higher energy costs is proving slower 
and is still far from complete.
But it is the third of these factors that will most likely infl uence developments in the world 
economy in the coming quarters. I refer here to the severe worsening of the fi nancial crisis in 
United States and in much of Europe, and to the turmoil on international fi nancial markets. 
Somewhat more than a year back now, when the US subprime mortgage crisis broke, there 
was great uncertainty over the scope and duration of the episode then beginning. Today, there 
is unfortunately no doubt that we are facing a global fi nancial crisis of enormous proportions.
Although at fi rst the diffi culties appeared to be confi ned to just a few investment funds and 
relatively minor US mortgage institutions, the overall number of banks affected has since wid-
ened considerably. We have witnessed a process, with no practical solution in sight, involving 
nationalisations, bankruptcies, bank interventions, the creation of new investor guarantee 
schemes and considerable curbs on market practices, such as those affecting the short-sell-
ing of equities.
The list of institutions affected includes most notably: the major investment banks, whose 
business model has succumbed to the turmoil; the US government-sponsored mortgage 
agencies; one of the biggest worldwide insurers; and major US credit institutions. In Europe, 
UK, Danish and Icelandic banks have been involved, as have more recently those from euro 
area countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany. Moreo-
ver, several European governments have announced their readiness to guarantee their banks’ 
deposits.
The foregoing developments pale into insignifi cance in the face of the importance of the US 
Treasury’s decision to propose a far-reaching programme whose stated aim is to tackle glo-
bally the serious problems besetting the American fi nancial system. The initial appropriation of 
$700 billion for this programme, and its dramatic presentation by the US Treasury Secretary, 
illustrate the scale of the problem. As you are aware, the plan was fi nally approved following 
heated debate in the House of Representatives and in the Senate.
Clearly, beyond its effects on specifi c banks, this unprecedented crisis is profoundly shifting 
some of the key coordinates that have framed global fi nancial developments in recent dec-
ades. An economy such as Spain’s, which has been fi nancing a substantial proportion of its 
expenditure abroad, can hardly isolate itself from the consequences of such deep-seated 
changes.
International fi nancial markets have moved from a situation of widespread risk undervaluation 
to one in which extraordinary caution is exercised in their evaluation. Past experience has 
clearly shown the tendency of markets to overreact. It is even possible that certain recent 
developments refl ect, at least partly, an excessive reaction. But it is unreasonable to expect 
that, once the situation has returned to normal, international fi nancing conditions will simply be 
as they were prior to the summer of 2007, which nobody today hesitates to qualify as exces-
sively lax.
Likewise, few question the fact that the expansion of the balance sheets of a large number of 
major fi nancial institutions exceeded limits which should not have been overstepped. The current 
deleveraging process may initially refl ect the correction of some of the excesses committed. But 
taking a broader view, it also reveals a more fundamental movement towards a general reduction 
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in the debt levels of fi nancial intermediaries and the containment of credit fl ows, the effects of 
which must likewise be felt by the ultimate borrowers, namely households and fi rms.
Finally, I should point out that the magnitude of the imbalances generated and the scale of 
intervention designed have prompted a necessary pause for refl ection on the role the eco-
nomic authorities should play in developing and supervising fi nancial markets.
For the moment, however, I shall simply reiterate that one of the aspects highlighted by the 
current fi nancial crisis is how important it is for central banks to have the appropriate instru-
ments with which to manage their liquidity provision policies with suffi cient fl exibility. And all the 
more so in the presence of turmoil which, as at present, is profoundly altering the operation of 
the channels through which liquid resources are normally re-distributed among the various 
banks that apply for them. In this respect, it is widely acknowledged that the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy operational framework is allowing euro area banks’ liquidity requirements to 
be met, thereby preventing the emergence of additional pressures that might exacerbate the 
situation on fi nancial markets.
In any event, returning to the most important macroeconomic developments that will infl uence 
the performance of the Spanish economy, it is clear that fi nancial conditions in the euro area, 
as in the rest of the world, have tightened notably. Such tightening has compounded the ad-
verse effects of the oil and commodities shocks on agents’ real incomes and output capacity. 
The latest data, for the second quarter of the current year, show how the growth rate in the 
euro area has weakened to 1.4%, standing below potential. The latest ECB projections point-
ed to increases of between 1.1% and 1.7% this year, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009, 
subject to considerable uncertainty and to downside risks that have increased in recent 
weeks.
In addition, while growth was slowing, infl ationary pressures were heightening and infl ation 
expectations were being revised upwards, which has raised the risk that they may become 
unanchored. Nobody doubts that an eventual loss of control of infl ation, with the subsequent 
deterioration in price expectations, would contribute to seriously exacerbating a slide towards 
economic weakening in the area. 
Such is the diffi cult setting in which the ECB Governing Council has had to take its monetary 
policy decisions. These decisions have been pondered bearing in mind at all times the impact 
of tighter fi nancial conditions and of the change in the dynamism of demand. Thus, against a 
backdrop of growing uncertainty, it was decided to hold interest rates steady until last July, 
when the materialisation of some of the previously identifi ed risks to price stability made a 25 bp 
increase necessary.
At the recent Governing Council meeting, however, we noted a weakening in activity in the 
area and the fact that the latest price data point to the onset of some easing. Infl ationary risks 
have therefore diminished somewhat, though they have not disappeared, meaning that mon-
etary policy should continue contributing to containing them. Given the seriousness of the 
tensions on international fi nancial markets, we also reiterated the readiness of the Eurosystem 
to provide all the liquidity required for as long as should prove necessary. 
Let me now turn to the Spanish economy. As I was able to explain to you here before the sum-
mer, the change in cycle in Spain had started before the episode of fi nancial turmoil, making 
itself felt mainly in the real estate sector, which set in train a correction of the excesses that had 
built up during the long expansionary phase. 
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These excesses had largely arisen owing to the global environment of fi nancial laxity and un-
dervaluation of risk, and to monetary and fi nancial conditions that were particularly accom-
modative for Spain following EMU membership. These conditions were based on interest rates 
that held at low levels over a very extensive period and which were conducive to rapid indebt-
edness by households and by fi rms, mainly those related to the real estate sector.
In any event, the adjustment of the real estate sector began slowly, mirroring the gradualism 
with which the determinants of residential investment changed. Hence, as the change in mon-
etary policy stance that began in late 2005 progressively passed through to household and 
corporate borrowing costs and as the overpricing of housing became more patent, the dyna-
mism of the sector eased off.
However, this gradual pattern was altered when the international fi nancial crisis raised credit 
risk premiums across the board, blocked a most signifi cant part of banks’ wholesale funding 
mechanisms and spread uncertainty and mistrust, most particularly in respect of economies 
subject to real estate adjustments. Against this background, the demand for housing fell off 
drastically, when the production of houses was still at a very high volume. House prices, after 
several years of increasingly more moderate rises, began to post small declines in some mar-
ket indicators as from the second quarter of this year, while housing starts fell by almost half. 
This abrupt change in scenario, together with the tightening of fi nancing conditions, which I 
shall address in greater detail later, meant that real estate companies had to restructure, with 
some of them even going bankrupt. This series of factors compounded the correction of the 
residential sector with adverse consequences for employment, which is acting as the main 
channel through which the adjustment of the sector is spreading to the rest of the economy.
Household consumption is rapidly refl ecting the deterioration in confi dence, against a back-
drop of considerable fi nancial tensions, and the abrupt turnaround in the employment situa-
tion. As a result, a certain rise in the saving rate consistent with the current scenario of greater 
uncertainty and fi nancing diffi culties might be taking place. I should stress that this far-reaching 
slowdown in private consumption is the factor that is most contributing to the loss of dyna-
mism in the economy. Business investment also slowed rapidly, in line with the changing fi nan-
cial conditions, the profi le of domestic demand and the deterioration in business confi dence. 
Nonetheless, exports are sustaining a relatively high growth rate, despite worsening world 
trade so far this year, and they are providing some support to investment in equipment. 
This sound performance of foreign sales, along with the marked cut in the rate of increase of 
imports, has seen the external sector make a positive contribution to GDP growth for the fi rst 
time since 2001, partly cushioning the slowdown in national demand. Net external demand is 
therefore providing a buffer of support against the widespread weakening trend.
On the supply side, the fact that the sharp adjustment in employment is taking place just when 
labour costs are posting high increases is of particular relevance. This is because collective 
bargaining is taking on board the deterioration in infl ation expectations and because the activa-
tion of indexation clauses is passing through last year’s infl ation deviation to wages. Unfortu-
nately, there is a risk that this will occur again in 2009, potentially causing second-round effects 
in an economic situation in which the behaviour of employment is very important, as I stated, 
for regulating the cyclical downturn in the economy. Furthermore, this increase in wages has 
not been accompanied by productivity gains on a similar scale. Therefore, the increases in unit 
labour costs continue to be higher than those of our trading partners. If, moreover, business 
margins were to continue widening as they have in the past, the diffi culties for the economy of 
competing abroad would increase, undermining one of the potential sources of recovery.
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Infl ation posted a rapid increase in the fi rst half of the year, despite the loss of momentum of 
activity. As in other countries, the surge in oil and food commodities prices largely explains this, 
although the Spanish economy’s high energy dependence and low energy taxes have tended 
to amplify this effect. The latest fi gures point to the start of what should be a phase of gradual 
containment, though I shall return to this point later.
Among the factors that have weakened expenditure growth is the tightening of fi nancial condi-
tions. Given its close relation to the international fi nancial crisis, it is appropriate to focus on the 
analysis of the behaviour of credit in Spain during this period.
Loans granted by resident banks to Spanish households and fi rms began to slow before the 
increase in defaults on US subprime mortgage loans unleashed the present international fi nan-
cial crisis. The gradual increase in fi nancing costs, the downward revision of expectations of 
future income and rises in wealth, and the very levels of debt attained had already acted before 
the summer of 2007 to lower the growth rate of debt towards a more sustainable pace.
Naturally, greater caution in risk assessment and the sharp reduction in international fi nancing 
fl ows that the international fi nancial crisis has entailed have further dampened the supply side, 
likewise contributing to slowing credit.
As an overall result of both forces, the latest fi gures show year-on-year growth rates of fi nanc-
ing to Spanish households and fi rms of around 10% and 7%, respectively. Analysed from a 
shorter time perspective, the expansion of credit proves somewhat more moderate, although 
it is not signifi cantly removed from nominal GDP growth. As might be expected in the current 
situation, characterised by greater uncertainty and risk aversion, new loans are being granted 
under more onerous conditions than in the past, which include lower loan-to-value ratios and 
shorter maturities.
The trajectory followed by credit in Spain to August may be said to be behaving in a manner 
consistent with the process of adjustment the Spanish economy is undergoing and with the 
prevailing global conditions, which entail higher fi nancial costs, heightened risk aversion and 
serious diffi culties in obtaining funds on international fi nancial markets.
From the standpoint of fi nancial stability, Spanish banks have demonstrated greater resilience 
than their counterparts in many other countries. But as I have previously stated, there is no 
room for complacency here, since the challenges ahead are considerable. A crisis such as that 
currently rocking worldwide fi nancial markets can hardly be neutral for those who depend on 
such markets to a relatively greater extent. And nor can the fact that a sizeable portion of the 
Spanish fi nancial system’s fi nancing fl ows is tied in one way or another to the real estate sector 
be ignored either.
However, for numerous reasons, including most notably the quality of our regulation and su-
pervision, Spanish banks have not been involved either in the generation, marketing or acqui-
sition of the toxic fi nancial products that are infl icting such harm on the international fi nancial 
system. Their levels of effi ciency, profi tability and solvency have placed them, moreover, in a 
position of relative strength to withstand this crisis.
Accordingly, and in the light of the events currently unfolding daily in the international fi nancial 
system, I wish to make a call in my capacity as governor of the Banco de España for calm, and 
to reiterate my confi dence in the Spanish fi nancial system, which is well-managed, regulated and 
supervised. I can assure you that, at present, there is no threat to Spanish depositors’ savings.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2008 TESTIMONY OF THE GOVERNOR TO THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET COMMITTEE
All these considerations on the international fi nancial crisis add great uncertainty to the outlook 
for growth in the Spanish economy. The information available points to practically zero or even 
negative quarter-on-quarter rates of change in the second half of the year, and to the exten-
sion of the adjustment into 2009, with rates of increase in output that are more diffi cult to 
gauge but which will probably also be weak. The ongoing correction of residential investment 
may be expected to intensify, since the fi gures for work under way will show next year that 
housing starts have ground to a halt. It is likewise foreseeable that the slowdown in consump-
tion will continue, due above all to the weakness of employment, and that business investment 
will mirror the decline in activity. Accordingly, the contribution of domestic demand to GDP 
growth might turn negative, and would only be relieved by the external sector if the buoyancy 
of exports and, as seems likely, the slowdown in imports continue. The importance that the 
dynamising effect of the external sector acquires in the current circumstances highlights the 
relevance of competitiveness in the future.
The foreseeable trend of infl ation points to increasingly more moderate average price increas-
es during the rest of the year, owing largely to the baseline effects of the energy and processed 
food price increases late last year and to the recent declines in crude oil prices, provided these 
are sustained. This trajectory should extend over the coming year, further supported by the 
sluggishness of demand. However, to attain fuller and more sustainable convergence with the 
euro area, the upside risks stemming from the indirect and second-round effects of cost and 
price increases this year must be prevented from materialising.
The macroeconomic basis on which the government has drawn up the State Budget for 2009 
includes, in its main outline, the trajectory of the macroeconomic adjustment I referred to ear-
lier. But it is subject to major downside risks, especially as regards the course of domestic 
demand and, in particular, of residential investment. It should further be borne in mind that the 
global economic situation and the impact of the international fi nancial turmoil tend to heighten 
these risks.
The design of the Budget should take into consideration the pronounced change in the econ-
omy’s cyclical situation, and bear in mind the speed at which public fi nances are being af-
fected. In previous public appearances I have warned that the sound fi scal results of the previ-
ous years had a component very closely linked to the expansion of the real estate sector, 
which would tend to disappear in lower growth phases. Unfortunately, the loss of momentum 
of tax revenue is proving acute. And combined with the signifi cant revenue-related impact of 
the expansionary measures taken this year, that means that the end-year fi gures for public fi -
nances in 2008 will be worse than projected only a few months ago, and that the general 
government balance at the end of the year will be in defi cit.
The weakness of activity in 2009 will give rise to a defi cit-widening dynamic which, given the 
uncertainty facing us, will mean that that the defi cit may be greater than forecast in the draft 
Budget. I must reiterate here the call for prudence in fi scal policy management, whereby budg-
etary policy should focus on allowing the automatic stabilisers to continue deploying their in-
tended countercyclical effect, while preserving the bases for maintaining a sound position in 
the long term. Given the uncertainty surrounding the world growth scenario, it is important that 
fi scal policy should retain room for manoeuvre in the face of potential situations of greater 
weakness. Nothing could be worse than having to face fresh turmoil when the only option 
possible is that of having to reduce the defi cit, as we have had to do in the past and as has 
happened recently in other developed countries. Further, the major advantage for the Spanish 
economy that maintaining a comparatively low public debt/GDP ratio entails should be pre-
served.
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Watchfulness will also be needed to prevent current expenditure overruns that reduce the 
leeway available to undertake public investment programmes and fulfi l other productive ex-
penditure commitments made in the Budget. We should not forget that when public over-
spending occurs, the subsequent adjustment usually falls on productive spending and, most 
particularly, on public investment, with adverse consequences for long-term growth potential. 
In the current circumstances, moreover, having some scope to carry out the infrastructure in-
vestment plans under way is crucial for smoothing the adjustment in the construction sector.
The State Budget should, in my view, comply with these premises. But the regional and local 
governments also have a major role to play in this task, since they account for a most signifi -
cant portion of public spending - and, in particular, of public investment – and are facing a 
phase of rapid decline in their revenue-raising capacity.
Elsewhere, a worrying aspect of the scenario I have described is the speed and intensity of the 
response by employment, which is amplifying the effect of the correction of the housing sector 
on the rest of the economy. This reveals the persistence of inadequacies in the workings of 
factor and product markets that mean that the weight of the adjustment falls on the level of 
employment, hindering the necessary reallocation of productive factors across sectors. 
The behaviour of wage costs and the high margins seen in certain activities tend, moreover, to 
make the infl ationary episode more persistent, with the adverse consequences this may have 
for price and cost-formation habits and for the trend of the relative prices and costs that bear 
on the economy’s competitiveness.
It is therefore very important not to lose sight of the fact that the main instrument available in 
the current circumstances is that of making structural reforms that enhance the economy’s 
fl exibility, liberalise certain sectors and markets, and increase competition. Despite the efforts 
made in recent decades, there are still numerous areas of the Spanish economy that need 
reforms. I do not intend to address these in detail, but I shall refer briefl y to those spheres 
where I consider pressing action is needed. And I should stress that it is here where the po-
tential room for manoeuvre to counter weakening growth in the euro area is to be found.
In the labour market, it is imperative to bring about a milder reduction in employment in cyclical 
slowdowns. In this connection, we must explore channels which provide a response by wages 
to changes in the economic environment, aligning them to productivity gains, and avoiding 
upward inertia in the face of external shocks introduced by mechanisms such as wage in-
dexation clauses. It is also vital to hold long-term unemployment at low levels, and to do this 
the move from unemployment to employment status must be made easier, improving the 
workings of employment services and the effectiveness of active policies.
In the housing market, the regulations governing renting must be improved to make it more 
fl exible and profi table so as to promote the acquisition of houses for investment purposes, and 
thus help reduce excess supply. Further, putting these houses on the rental market would 
make it easier to meet the population’s demand for residential services. 
In services activities and, in particular, in the distributive sector there is also much scope to set 
in place a more competitive environment and achieve sizeable gains in effi ciency. I consider 
that the transposition of the services directive offers a unique opportunity for headway in 
achieving the objective of reducing our rate of infl ation and increasing the economy’s com-
petitiveness and household purchasing power in a setting in which incomes have been dented 
by dearer oil and the slowdown in employment.
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With the same objectives, improvements in the regulation of the network industries and, in 
particular, of the energy sector should be made to promote competition and increase energy 
effi ciency. The same applies for port, airport and railway freight transport services, sectors 
which are essential for strengthening the competitiveness of Spanish industry and exporters.
To conclude, I am confi dent that if the Spanish economy is capable of mobilising the potential 
nurtured over many years of building up stability and improving the workings of markets and 
institutions, then it may rise to the challenges and diffi culties facing it and continue to make 
progress in the medium term in narrowing the welfare differences with the most advanced 
countries.
7.10.2008.
